Does competition between hospitals improve clinical quality?: a review of evidence from two eras of competition in the English NHS by Bevan, Gwyn & Skellern, Matthew
  
Gwyn Bevan and Matthew Skellern 
Does competition between hospitals 
improve clinical quality?: a review of 
evidence from two eras of competition in the 
English NHS 
 




Bevan, Gwyn and Skellern, Matthew (2011) Does competition between hospitals improve clinical 
quality?: a review of evidence from two eras of competition in the English NHS. BMJ, 343 
(oct07). d6470-d6470. ISSN 0959-8138  
 
DOI: 10.1136/bmj.d6470  
 
© 2011 BMJ Publishing Group Ltd 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/40065/  
Available in LSE Research Online: August 2012 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
Does competition between hospitals improve clinical
quality? A review of evidence from two eras of
competition in the English NHS
Gwyn Bevan and Matthew Skellern review evidence on the effects of hospital competition on
quality of care within the English NHS and question whether they support government proposals to
extend competition
Gwyn Bevan professor of policy analysis 1, Matthew Skellern research student 2
1Department of Management, London School of Economics and Political Science, London WC2A 2AE, UK; 2Department of Economics, London
School of Economics and Political Science
The health secretary, Andrew Lansley, has proposed changes
to the English National Health Service (NHS) that will extend
the hospital market introduced by “New Labour” in the 2000s.1 2
This was the second era of hospital competition within the NHS;
the first, the “internal market,” applied throughout the UK from
1991 to 1997. Studies of the NHS markets have generally used
one of two paradigms,w1 either analysing the effects of the
market on the various players3-7 or using econometric methods
to test the relation between competition and outcomes.8-12 A
recent review encompasses both kinds of study.13 The different
types of study have come to different conclusions, and findings
from recent econometric studies10 11 have proved intensely
controversial.w2-w7 We outline the key features of the two eras
of hospital competition and review the literature and debates,
focusing on the effects of hospital competition on the quality
of care rather than on the costs (such as transaction costs) of
competition7 or other effects.
Two eras of hospital competition in the
English NHS
During 1991-97, a period of limited growth in NHS funding,
an “internal market” was introduced throughout the United
Kingdom.9 13 14 15 It changed health authorities’ responsibilities
by separating the roles of purchaser and provider of healthcare.
Hospitals were made independent of health authorities, typically
as directly managed units, which became NHS trusts regulated
by the Department of Health. Health authorities contracted
selectively with providers and constrained general practitioners’
referral options. However, general practitioners who opted for
various forms of general practice fundholdingw8-w10 were
allocated cash budgets to contract for elective care and could
choose where to refer their patients. Competition was between
NHS trusts and private providers. NHS trusts were expected to
avoid financial deficits but could not retain financial surpluses
and hence arguably lacked strong incentives to increase market
shares (table 1⇓). There was little information on, and no
external regulatory oversight of, quality of care.w11 w12
From 1997, the new Labour government abolished general
practice fundholding and strongly discouraged competition in
favour of a more cooperative model.14 15 Nevertheless, the
distinction between purchasers and providers was retained, thus
preserving scope for competition via selective contracting by
purchasers (primary care trusts or PCTs).
The “New Labour” hospital market, which applied only to
England, was developed from 2002 onwards, a period of
sustained increases in NHS funding (about 5% per year).14 15
Under this model PCTs contracted selectively with providers.
Within the PCTs, practice based commissioners, which could
be thought of as an extension of the general practice fundholding
model,w10 also contracted with providers but had indicative
budgets only. Competition was again between providers, but
there were more of them: NHS trusts, private providers,
independent sector treatment centres, andNHS foundation trusts.
Foundation trusts were high performing trusts that met
Department of Health criteria for autonomy and were subject
to approval and oversight by a new regulator, Monitor. They
were allowed to retain financial surpluses and hence arguably
had incentives to increase market shares.
The performance of NHS hospitals against targets, and on other
measures of clinical and financial performance, was published
and centrally managed; quality was regulated through
inspections. Providers’ prices were fixed and set by the
Department of Health so that competition would in principle
be on quality, not price. Patient choice of hospital for elective
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surgery was formally introduced from 2006. From 2007, a
website provided information on hospital quality, such as
waiting times, hospital standardised mortality ratios (HSMRs),
infection rates, and admission levels for various procedures.
Compared with the earlier internal market, the New Labour
market was better structured to encourage improvements in
clinical quality through the elimination of price competition;
the provision of greater information on quality; the introduction
of patient choice; and the provision of stronger incentives for
providers (particularly foundation trusts) to increase market
shares (table 1⇓).
Studies of market impacts on the different
players
In their evaluation of the impacts of the internal market on
purchasers and providers, Le Grand and colleagues observed
that: “Perhaps the most striking conclusion . . . is how little
overall measurable change there seems to have been related to
the core structures and mechanisms of the internal market.”3
Their explanation for this was that “the incentives were too
weak and the constraints were too strong.” Evaluations found
that only a few GP fundholders made material gains for their
patients7 w9w10 and that health authorities were largely ineffective
purchasers.3 7
Studies of the effects of the New Labour market found little
hard evidence of systemic improvements attributable to
competition arising from patient choice or selective contracting
by purchasers.4-7 13 Indeed, some suggested that any
improvements in quality were due to policies other than
competition.4 5 Studies of patient choice identified difficulties
in its implementation and a paucity of detailed, consistent, and
reliable information on quality of care.4 6 Dixon et al provided
evidence that patients made little use of the limited information
available, and relied on personal experience and their general
practitioners6; yet general practitioners did not have access to
trustworthy or reliable information on quality, and hence relied
on their own knowledge of providers.6 It is thus unclear to what
extent patients’ choices were informed by information on quality
of care.
Econometric studies
Table 2⇓ outlines five econometric studies that estimate the
causal effects of competition on outcomes. All face three
methodological challenges.
The first is measuring the intensity of competition. A simple
approach is to count the number of hospitals in the market, but
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is a better measure
because it takes account of the relative size of competitors. The
challenge is defining the size of a hospital’s market without
creating problems of “endogeneity” or reverse causality. For
example, the “variable radius measure” defines a hospital’s
market as consisting of all hospitals within the circular area
required to encompass (say) 90% of its patients. The problem
is that hospital quality is likely to influence patient
behaviour—for example, better hospitals may attract patients
from further afield and thus seem to operate in more competitive
markets—so quality is determining the estimated intensity of
competition, not the other way around. A good way of tackling
this problem is to predict patient behaviour based on exogenous
geographical and demographic variables, and construct measures
based on predicted (not actual) patient behaviour.16
The second problem is how to measure quality of care. The
studies in table 2⇓ measure clinical quality using hospital
mortality rates after acute myocardial infarction or from all
causes.11 Both measures have their problems. As hospitals do
not compete for patients who have had a myocardial infarction,
who are generally taken to the nearest appropriate hospital, it
is not clear that hospital deaths should decrease in response to
competition. However deaths after acute myocardial infarction
are used because they are seen as a good proxy for quality of
care throughout a hospital10 11 and also mitigate endogeneity
problems.10 Although all cause mortality rates include deaths
from elective surgery, perioperative deaths are so rare that
outcome measures that go beyond mortality are required.17
Patient reported outcome measures (PROMs) of health gain
(mobility gain, pain amelioration, etc) after surgery have been
available in England only since April 2009.w13
The third challenge is how to estimate the causal effect of
competition on quality. One reason for the controversy over
recent econometric papers10 11 is disagreement about the
econometric method of establishing causation. Econometricians
seek to establish causation by showing that variation in the
treatment variable (intensity of competition) is exogenous with
respect to the outcome variable (hospital quality): given
exogenous variation of the treatment variable, causality can be
inferred from correlation. An overriding focus of the studies in
table 2⇓ is on overcoming problems of “endogeneity” due to
reverse causality and omitted variables, in order that causal
inferences may be made. Two of the studies use variation
between hospitals to estimate the effects of competition.8 12 To
do this they need to separate differences in outcomes resulting
from competition from pre-existing differences between high
and low competition markets. Bloom et al seek to control for
these differences by assuming that hospitals in government held
marginal seats are less likely to be closed and hence that markets
in these areas will contain more hospitals than they would have
done if they had not been in marginal areas.12 Thus marginality,
they argue, is an “instrument” that provides exogenous variation
in competition intensity and hence permits causal inference.
The other three studies9-11 measure the effects of competition
using difference-in-difference estimation, which compares
differences in outcomes between hospitals before and after a
change in the competitive environment. The validity of their
estimates is premised on the claim that this change provides
exogenous variation in competition intensity thus allowing
causal inferences to be drawn. The difference-in-difference
design controls for pre-existing differences by assuming that
any change in outcome for those exposed to more competition
over and above the change in outcome for those exposed to less
competition is due to the (exogenous) increase in competition.
The 1990s internal market
Propper et al estimated the effect of competition (measured by
the number of competitors) on quality of care (measured by
hospital mortality after myocardial infarction, data for which
were published retrospectively in 1999).8 9 The first study,
averaging over three years, found that more intense competition
led to slightly higher mortality.8 The second study used
difference-in-difference to compare five years of competition
(“treatment”) with four of “control.”9 It found that more intense
competition led to higher observable quality (increased elective
admissions and shorter waiting times), but lower unobservable
quality (higher mortality after acute infarction). They conclude
that these excess deaths “more than matched the fall in death
rates due to technological innovation.”
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The 2000s New Labour market
Bloom et al 12 estimate the effects of competition (measured by
the number of competitors) on hospital management quality
and hospital mortality rates after myocardial infarction in
2005-6, when selective contracting was in place but before the
introduction of patient choice. They find that the addition of
one rival hospital increases management quality (by 0.4 standard
deviations) and decreases mortality rates (by 9.5%). They
conclude that competition increases hospital quality, but other
plausible explanations exist—for example, eliminating the threat
of closure in marginal constituencies may provide greater
institutional stability and lead to improved outcomes.
Patient choice of hospital for elective surgery was progressively
introduced from 2006. Cooper et al10 and Gaynor et al11 both
estimate the effect of the increased competition resulting from
this reform on hospital quality. Cooper et al use 13 measures
of intensity of competition and find that introducing patient
choice (where it was offered) led to fewer deaths from acute
myocardial infarction. This finding is robust to different
measures of competition, and different functional form
assumptions about the relation between competition and
outcomes. Gaynor et al seek to avoid endogeneity by calculating
Herfindahl-Hirschman indices based on predicted patient flows.
They find that patients exercised choice when it was offered—an
important finding in itself, given the difficulties in the
implementation of patient choice4 6—and that introducing patient
choice led to lower mortality rates from myocardial infarction
and all causes. They estimate that the reform saved about 4800
life years each year.
A valid difference-in-difference estimator must control, firstly,
for pre-existing differences in trends between more and less
competitive hospitals, and, secondly, for other changes occurring
contemporaneously with patient choice, which may have
affected the outcome variable. Cooper et al10 and Gaynor et al11
control for the first, but the second is problematic because the
policies of the 2000 national service framework for coronary
heart disease w14 w15 have been credited with major reductions in
mortality from myocardial infarction. Gaynor et al address this
concern by showing that more intense competition led to lower
all cause mortality rates even when deaths from myocardial
infarctions are subtracted from the measure. This suggests there
was something going on beyond the effects of the national
service framework. They also sought to control explicitly for
the framework’s effects by including as control variables uptake
of primary angioplasty; use of thrombolytics; ambulance
response times; and prescription of various drugs on discharge.
They find that doing so increased the estimated beneficial effects
of competition because the principal driver of reductions in
mortality from acute myocardial infarction was increased use
of thrombolytics, which mainly occurred in rural (generally less
competitive) areas.
Discussion
Studies examining market effects on various players generally
conclude that both eras of competition were ineffective and
highlight how difficult it has been to design and implement
effective competition.3-7 13 However, those using econometric
analyses of the internal market found that competition reduced
clinical quality as measured by hospital mortality rates after
myocardial infarction, while also reducing waiting times.8 9
When combined with other studies showing that prices also
fell,w16-w18 the implication is that the internal market resulted in
lower prices and improvements in observable quality (shorter
waiting lists), at the expense of unobservable quality (hospital
mortality rates). These findings were uncontroversial, as they
were consistent both with other evidence that the internal market
had produced few benefits, and with predictions from economic
theory.w19-w22 They seem to have had a key role in Mr Lansley’s
decision to abandon initial plans for price competition.w23-w25
The three econometric analyses of the New Labour market all
show a seemingly causal relation between greater competition
and lower hospital mortality (myocardial infarction and all
cause) that is robust to a range of alternative specifications and
explanations.9-11 The econometric studies of patient choice10 11
have proved highly controversial,w2-w7 partly because their
estimates cut against the grain of the findings on the internal
market and earlier studies of the New Labour market. These
two econometric studies are serious and rigorous responses to
the challenge of estimating the effects of competition on hospital
outcomes. Nevertheless, we have two observations on their
findings.
Firstly, these studies10 11 of patient choice for elective surgery
do not provide evidence of its effect on the quality of elective
surgery. This is because there is widespread evidence of
variation in quality of care within a hospital; mortality rates of
any form do not, therefore, provide a good measure of the
quality of elective surgery. Inspections of clinical governance
in the English NHS in the early 2000s found acute hospitals
typically had “a mix of good and poor services, often with a
dysfunctional clinical team.”13 w12 Moreover, evidence from the
United States shows substantial variations in mortality rates
between individual surgeons and procedures within cardiac
surgery at the same hospital.18 The figure⇓ plots, for English
NHS hospitals in 2009-10, the relation between hospitals’
standardised mortality ratiosw26 and the quality of their elective
surgery procedures, as measured by its PROMs for hernia repair
and hip replacement.w13No significant relation exists between
these measures. We therefore conclude that the effect of patient
choice for elective surgery on the quality of elective surgery is
not captured by studies that use hospital mortality as an outcome
variable and can be tested only by using measures that are
specific to elective surgery, such as PROMs. Although no
PROMs data exist for before the introduction of patient choice,
they could potentially be used to measure the effect of
competition within the English NHS by comparison with the
other UK countries.
Secondly, the studies both assume that competition in the
electives market provides incentives for hospitals to improve
elective surgery and that delivering such improvements requires
a general tightening up of hospital management in ways that
lead to across the board improvements in hospital quality.10 11
It is equally plausible, however, that such competition for
elective surgery might, through diversion of management effort,
have negatively affected the quality of other hospital services.w22
The chain of causation is not adequately understood; as Propper
has argued elsewhere,19 there is a “black box” in our
understanding of exactly what purchasers, managers, and clinical
practitioners do in response to competition that affects outcomes.
Given the plausibility of both of the above possible outcomes,
we believe that a key finding of these two econometric studies
is that introducing patient choice for elective surgery in the New
Labour market did not reduce quality elsewhere in hospitals.
Conclusions and policy implications
Like Le Grand,20 we believe there are strong grounds for
introducing patient choice into the NHS as an end in itself, given
its potential to empower patients and give them greater control
over the conditions of their care.w27 Gaynor et al11 show that,
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when patients were offered choice, they exercised it, and hence
provide evidence of the desirability of patient choice as part of
the policy mix on these grounds. Nevertheless, how patient
choice has affected outcomes in elective surgery remains an
open question; the exact role it should play in the policy mix is
therefore unclear. Other open questions include: what is the cost
effectiveness of competition, and how does this compare with
other policies for increasing hospital quality? Furthermore, how
might quality of care be improved in rural areas (eg, Cornwall)4
where competition is unalterably weak, or for types of care for
which it is more difficult to design effective competition?More
research is required before conclusions can be drawn about the
effect of recent reforms on hospital quality, let alone about the
merits ofMr Lansley’s proposals further to extend competition.
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Tables
Table 1 Structure and regulation of the two English hospital markets
New Labour market (2002-09)Internal market (1991-97)
NHS trusts
From 2003, independent sector treatment centres
From 2004, NHS foundation trusts






From 2006, practice-based commissioning
Health authorities
Varieties of general practice fundholding
Purchasers
From 2006, the “Choose and Book” system enabled patients to choose between
providers
NonePatient choice
From 2004, fixed hospital prices were introduced under Payment by ResultsNot publicly known (except for extracontractual referrals)Prices
From 2007, the NHS Choices website provided limited information on quality to help
patients choose
Information on waiting lists but not on outcomes such as
hospital mortality rates for acute myocardial infarction
Quality
2002 to 2005: inspection of NHS hospitals for implementation of the systems and
processes of clinical governance and publication of aggregate performance in annual
“star ratings”; private providers subjected to registration requirements and regular
inspections
2006 to 2009: annual publication of performance of NHS hospitals in the annual “health
check” in two domains, finance and quality, backed by “light touch” inspections;
NHS hospitals required to avoid deficits
Purchaser efficiency index: health authorities required to
reduce costs per episode by 3% a year
No external regulatory oversight of quality
Regulation
foundation trusts were also regulated by Monitor; private providers subject to registration
and “light touch” inspections
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Table 2| Studies of competition in the English NHS
Main findings
Years studied*Main measure(s)
ReformStudy ControlTreatmentQualityDegree of competition
Increasing competition from the 25th to the





mortality rate for acute
myocardial infarction in
over 50s








Hospitals exposed to competition increased
elective admissions and decreased waiting
times but had increased mortality. Overall
effect was to save 1.32 million person
months of waiting time, and lose around 11
800 life years due to earlier death. Costs









A one standard deviation increase in
competition led to a 0.31% fall in mortality
annually between April 2006 and December
2008, off a 2005 baseline of 13.96%. Overall
effect was about 300 fewer deaths from






mortality rate for acute
myocardial infarction
Various GP centred HHIs:
area encompassing 95% of
general practice’s patients
(actual and predicted patient
flows); hospitals, within a 30







A 10% fall in the HHI decreases acute
myocardial infarction mortality rates by
2.91% and all cause mortality rates by
0.99%. This implies a 0.3% decrease in the
average hospital’s mortality rate, or around
4800 life years saved
2003-42007-830 day all location
mortality rate for acute
myocardial infarction
among 35-74 year-olds
28 day in-hospital all
cause mortality rate
Hospital centred HHIs using
patient flows predicted on







Adding a rival hospital increases
management quality by 0.4 standard
deviations and decreases mortality rates by
9.5%
None2005-628 day in-hospital
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Figure
Relation between hospital standardised mortality ratios and patient reported outcome measures for hernia repair and hip
replacement surgery in English NHS hospitalsw13 w26
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